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FORGIVE US OUR PRESS PASSES
CAPTAIN MICHAEL T. SHERMAN, U.S. NAVY-RET.*
It was the best of coverage, it was the worst of coverage. It was
Saudi Arabia, and it was a seminal period in modern television
coverage. The manner in which the military responded to the me-
dia during the Persian Gulf War, the public's response to the sub-
sequent coverage, and the media's wails of outrage will be dis-
cussed passionately for many years.'
There are incredibly ambivalent emotional responses gener-
ated in this country when we discuss the American news media.
We recognize their special role in a democratic society as watch-
dogs of freedom, upholders of the public trust, defenders of the
downtrodden, and so forth2 (there was obviously a reason why Su-
* Captain Michael T. Sherman, U.S. Navy-Ret., is a 26-year Navy veteran of the mili-
tary-media wars. His career in the Navy began with the Vietnam War and ended with the
Gulf War. In between he served in ships of the Pacific Fleet, the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam,
Japan, San Diego, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. Captain Sherman was recently the
Navy's liaison to the Hollywood motion picture industry where he was technical advisor to
such movies as "The Hunt for Red October," "Flight of the Intruder," and "Patriot
Games." He escorted the first newsmen into Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, on August 13, 1990,
and remained there to set up and run the Joint Information Bureau during Operation De-
sert Shield. He is credited with handling the largest contingent of media ever assembled to
cover a military operation. He has lectured on the military and the media at seminars
throughout the United States. Captain Sherman retired from the military in March, 1992,
and now works for a major corporation in San Francisco as their director of International
Public Relations.
1 See Richard Zoglin, Volleys on the Information Front: Frustrated by Pools, Censor-
ship and Tight-lipped Military Officials, the Media Fight for More and More Detailed-
News from the Battlefield, TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 44 (discussing media outrage over military
press restrictions); see also David Gergen, Why America Hates the Press: The Gulf War
Wasn't Vietnam. You Wouldn't Have Known that from the Way Many Reporters Ap-
proached It. Now, It's Time for Serious Soul-Searching, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar.
11, 1991, at 57 (discussing media coverage during Gulf War). Despite the huge popular sup-
port for the war, the media treated it like Vietnam by approaching it from an anti-war
perspective. Id. This obvious bias has led to public outcries for even greater restrictions on
the press in times of war. Id.
2 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965). Justice Clark said, "A responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration....
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscar-
riage of justice." Id. at 343. "Everyone seems to agree that without an inquiring free press
there can be no true democracy." Richard M. Clurman, The Media Learn a Lesson, N.Y.
Tins, Dec. 2, 1983, at A27. According to David Kohler, a lawyer and journalist, "When
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perman's secret identity was as a newsman!). We often, however,
decry their unforgivable tactics, incomprehensible and reprehensi-
ble insensitivity, sometimes questionable character, and boundless
enthusiasm to identify exactly what is important to us in this
world.3 For the past two decades, the media have quietly assumed
the role of keeper of the public conscience not through public man-
date or affirmation, but rather through the public's tacit accept-
ance of the ongoing coup.
The mutually conflicting feelings about the media are espe-
cially prominent among Americans in the military who have dedi-
cated their lives to defending the basic principles of freedom and
democracy. The media's right to write is exactly what the military
has sworn to uphold and defend. Simultaneously, military person-
nel have a sworn duty to those they command to ensure that their
ultimate freedom-their right to live-is in no way jeopardized by
the information published or broadcast by the media. Thus, there
exists a concomitant need to protect the media's freedom to cover
and document a military operation, and a military commander's
freedom to wage a sensible campaign and possibly save lives in the
process.4 As these goals are often at odds, a unique symbiotic yet
adversarial relationship has developed between the media and the
military.
One of the biggest problems with the military and the media,
something most military will not discuss, is the exceptional oppor-
tunity the media can provide for a quick return to civilian life. Un-
like most interview situations, any military person quoted by the
they were putting this country together, they were right, I feel, believing the press would
play a watchdog role ... The press is one of the main cogs in a democracy." Ray McAllister,
From Philistines to Noriega Tapes, RICHMOND NEWs LEADER, Dec. 5, 1990, at B1.
' See David Goody, Pressures to Impound the Public's Watchdog, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE,
Apr. 26, 1985, at 5. The criticism of the press can be summed up in the words of former
White House science adviser George Keyworth II when he accused the press of "trying to
tear down America." Id. (citing general public consensus that press has a liberal bias). For-
mer Nebraska Chief Justice Norman Krishova said that a "holier than thou" attitude has
developed in some parts of the media. Tobin Beck, Krishova Warns Against Arrogance by
Media, UPI, Oct. 7, 1984, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI file; see also Clurman,
supra note 2, at A27 (noting growing public resentment of media's perceived arrogance).
' See Howard Kurtz & Barton Gellman, Guidelines Set for News Coverage of Wars;
Pentagon Refuses to Drop Insistence on Reviewing All Stories from Battlefield, WASH.
POST, May 22, 1992, at A23. According to Pentagon spokesperson, Pete Williams, "The mili-
tary believes it must retain the option to review news material to avoid the inadvertent
inclusion in news reports of information that would endanger troop safety or the success of a
military mission." Id. The new regulations retain military pools, but they will be used less
extensively. Id.
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media instantly becomes a spokesperson for that entire branch of
the service. Privates and seamen are interviewed and then re-
quoted ad nauseam. Unfortunately, the military does not forgive a
misquote. Many careers have been lost, sunk and made unsalvage-
able following an interview. Although it is easy for the journalists
to make light of that possibility, the fact remains: one screw-up in
the press outlives three hundred "atta-boys" from the captain! In
the military, one gets graded on something called "good judg-
ment," and speaking out in the media simply is not considered
good judgment.
Accordingly, today there is a dynamic adversarial relationship
between the media and the armed forces that many blame on the
Vietnam War-as if thirty years was not enough time to heal.'
True, Vietnam War coverage outraged many veterans and civilians
and continues to foster unreasonable anti-media emotions, 6 even
within the youngest military men and women whose only recollec-
tions of Vietnam exist in history books. Adversarial relationships
such as those, however, existed well before Vietnam, the Civil War,
and even the Revolutionary War.7 The conflict, though, goes much
deeper than that. The military simply knows that no matter how
trustworthy and honest a reporter can be, news is business. In the
final analysis, the public will vote with their money and remote
controls. Revenues will fall or rise on those votes and editors, pub-
lishers, station managers, and owners ultimately will decide what is
printed, published or broadcast on this basis.
Since the Vietnam War, one of the major complaints from the
modern military has been that the media simply cannot report
news. Reporters have to be part of the story. They have to insinu-
ate their feelings, beliefs, philosophies, ideologies, and emotions
into every story. Journalism has lost its objectivity. Many, both in
and out of the military, truly believe that the media lost the Viet-
5 See Richard Harwood, The Military's Bogus Enemy: The Real Culprit is Politics,
Not the Press, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1984, at C5 (discussing military resentment of media
actions in Vietnam).
' See, e.g., id. Robert Asprey, an analyst and historian of the Vietnam War, speaks
about the many letters he has received from military personnel reflecting their deep resent-
ment of journalists. Id.
7 See Peter Andrews, The Media and the Military: It's Been a Long and Acrimonious
Road from Bull Run to Basra. Sometimes the Press Has the Upper Hand; Sometimes the
Generals Do; But the Basic Argument Never Changes, AM. HERITAGE, Jul.-Aug. 1991, at 78.
Even during the Civil War, the media was critical of the military on both sides. Id.
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nam war for the United States,8 and indeed many books have been
written attempting to prove or disprove this thesis.9 Admittedly,
the media are no better or worse than any of our institutions, but
they control the airwaves and printing presses. One sage military
man once said, "Don't argue with the man who buys ink by the
barrel, you can't win."' 0
The media have assumed a disproportionate role in the cover-
age of events, but that does not mean we always agree with their
motivation and tactics. They are, in fact, coloring and flavoring the
news they report. Pick up a paper and look for a good news story,
one without enormously descriptive adverbs and personal insights
by the reporter. It is hard to find. Watch the news and see how
broadcast journalists convey their views with inflection, body lan-
guage and subtle facial movements.
Many people erroneously believe that Vietnam was a "live"
war. Videotapes were still being perfected in the middle to late six-
ties and 16mm film and 35mm still photos were still the tools of
the trade during Vietnam. Film was shipped to Hong Kong,
processed and sent out of the earth station to New York or the
West Coast. This took many hours, if not days, especially if the
film had to come out of the "boonies." As a result, the Department
of Defense ("DoD") still had time to advise the next of kin when a
8 See Emily Yoffe, De Borchgrave: A Cold Warrior's Battle with a World He Sees Full
of Dupes, Deception, and Disinformation, WASH. POST, July 8, 1984, Magazine, at 6.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, a renowned journalist, insists that the press intentionally slanted
media coverage for its own gain. Id. According to General Tecumseh "Terrible T" Circle,
who voiced his unequivocal support for the press pool system, "Nothing went right after
Vietnam... the war the press lost." John McKelway, Famed Briefer "General T" Talks in
Circles, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at B1.
' In support of this proposition, see ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE & ROBERT Moss, THE
SPIKE (1980). De Borchgrave alleges that Communist operatives bribed a significant portion
of the American Press. Id. at 6. He recounts his own experience where a KGB agent ap-
proached him offering substantial financial inducement to write articles critical of capital-
ism and the United States. Id. For an opposing view, see DANIEL C. HALLIN, THE UNCEN-
SORED WAR (1986) and RICHARD M. CLURMAN, BEYOND MALICE: THE MEDIA'S YEARS OF
RECKONING (1988). Clurman and Hallin both feel that many factors contributed to the fail-
ure in Vietnam, with most of them being either military or political in nature.
10 Steve Neal, Rumsfield's Not So Secret Weapon, CHI. TRm., Aug. 15, 1985, at C23
(quoting Retired Colonel William I. Greener, USAF, Assistant Secretary of Defense and
Pentagon spokesperson). The credit for this phrase is subject to question. See Lucy Killea,
Sometimes Police Need Protection, Too, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1990, at B2 (crediting Mark
Twain); Taxing the Cable TV Companies, L.A. TIMEs, June 3, 1990, at B12 (crediting Will
Rogers). Although its origin may be in doubt, the phrase clearly refers to newspaper editors.
John Morrissey, R & T Shareholder Sues Over $800,000 Donation, Bus. DATELINE, Feb. 24,
1986, sec. 1 at 1.
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service member was wounded or killed. Sometimes this worked,
sometimes it did not, but at least DoD had the chance.
Today, the rules have changed drastically. High tech portable
satellite dishes, small portable cameras, and special facsimile pho-
tographic kits are able to broadcast live or within minutes from
any locale in the world." Believe me, if it can be done in Saudi
Arabia, it can be done anywhere. This means that your son, father,
mother, aunt, or uncle may be the featured player on the 6 p.m.
newscast as you watch them wage war. This may seem far-fetched,
but you have to believe it's true. More than one network wanted to
set up its satellite dishes on the front-lines to broadcast live from
the Gulf War. 12
The second most drastic change since Vietnam concerns the
role of the journalist. There have arisen categories of journalists,
specialists if you will, who do not resemble anything we would con-
sider a balanced newsperson. The newest phenomenon is the neu-
tral journalist. This person has no allegiance to country or state,
only to his or her news organization, and even that pales when they
start thinking about by-lines.' 3 They refuse to be affiliated with
their own governments so they can cover both sides of a conflict.
They would have gleefully reported on the Allied bombing of Dres-
den or Berlin-reporting the Nazi point of view. And, they tell us,
they will be the final arbiters of what is sensitive or classified infor-
mation and when and where it should be released. They obviously
have some sort of intrinsic and infallible set of criteria that allow
them this luxury. This is the same group who succumbed to the
pressures of the marketplace and saw fit to release the name of an
" See Rita Ciolli, Military and Media: Uneasy Partners in the Gulf, Gov. EXECUTIVE,
Feb. 1991. The usual equipment carried by the Vietnam era journalist to cover the war was
a typewriter. Id. Today, lightweight mobile telesystems powered by portable generators are
the tools of the trade. Id. With the onset of satellites, news coverage has become instantane-
ous. Id.
12 Id.
13 See John Corry, TV News and the Neutrality Principle, THE JERUSALEM POST, May
17, 1991 (Features Section). Perhaps the most familiar example of the neutral journalist is
Peter Arnett of CNN, who covered events in Baghdad during the Gulf War. Arnett's broad-
casts angered many who felt that he was spreading Iraqi propaganda, even though the
broadcasts carried a disclaimer that Iraqi censors had gone over the footage. Arnett once
broadcast that the Allies had destroyed an infant formula factory rather than a biological
weapons plant, as the military claimed. The only possible evidence to support his statement
was a sign just outside the building, indicating that it was an infant formula factory. How-
ever, the sign was in English. Barring a tourist attraction, it is hard to imagine an English
sign in the middle of an Arab nation.
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alleged rape victim because a supermarket tabloid did the same. 4
Next, there is the specialty journalist. Their shows, such as
The Today Show, Good Morning America, Hard Copy, Inside Edi-
tion, Geraldo, and Joan Rivers, present a sensationalized focus on
emotional issues without regard to journalistic principles in a des-
perate search for high ratings. Their presence creates a huge chal-
lenge to the military when trying to respond to the hundreds of
legitimate hard news agencies.
The VIP journalist, such as Dan Rather, Barbara Walters, and
Peter Jennings, is another phenomenon. Does his or her presence
change the event and make the news? The Heisenberg uncertainty
principle in physics postulates that the presence of the observer
changes the nature of the observed. 15 This certainly applies to the
media.
Finally, there is the expert analyst. Where did these guys
come from, where did they go, and what was their agenda? General
Perry Smith (one of the few good analysts working for CNN during
the war) in his inevitable book exposed one such prominent mili-
tary analyst, Ed Luttwak.'6 According to General Smith, Luttwak
duplicitously predicted high American casualties in a broadcast, a
prediction he knew was incorrect.'1 Luttwak reportedly hoped to
encourage General Schwarzkopf to continue the air bombardment
14 See Andrew Bilski, A Seaside Sex Scandal: A Possible Rape Victim Is Publicly
Named, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 29, 1991, at 28. Patricia Bowman's name first appeared in
London's Sunday Mirror and then the supermarket tabloid The Globe. Id.
NBC News and The New York Times were the first major American media organiza-
tions to mention her name. Id. There was a public outcry in some sectors of the population
and there were criminal charges filed against The Globe for violating Florida's "rape shield
law" which forbids public disclosure of an alleged rape victim's name. For a complete dis-
cussion of the circumstances surrounding this incident, and the constitutional questions as-
sociated with the protection of rape victims' privacy rights, see Gary Giampetruzzi, Note,
Raped Once, but Violated Twice: Constitutional Protection of a Rape Victim's Privacy, 66
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 151 (1992).
16 See Squeezed Light, Sci. AM., Jun. 1986, at 69. This is actually a corollary of the
uncertainty principle. Id. The principle states that pairs of "complimentary" variables can-
not be measured simultaneously in atomic systems. Id. For example, knowledge of the pre-
cise location of an electron prevents acquiring knowledge of its velocity and vice versa. Id.
1 See generally GENERAL PERRY SMITH, How CNN FOUGHT THE WAR: A VIEw FROM
THE INSIDE (1991) (criticizing press, particularly, CNN and Arnett).
17 See Joel Achenbach, War Almanac-The Experts, In Retreat; After-the-Fact Expla-
nations for the Gloomy Predictions, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at Di. The book exposed
many predictions made by the "so-called" military experts as inaccurate. Id. at D12. Quot-
ing Luttwak, "If tens of thousands of Marines on the ground were inexcusably sent into a
frontal attack against the Iraqi minefields, entrenched infantry, dug-in tanks and ample
artillery now in Kuwait, many would die." Id. at D1.
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rather than initiate an early ground campaign. 18 If true, such ac-
tion creates an abomination of the media process. It puts the news
media in the role of military policy maker rather than legitimate
analyst. This is not the role of the media.
Saudi Arabia was not only a place to view the new range of
weaponry, but also a place to view the new face of journalism.
Evolving since Watergate, new principles, new techniques, new
equipment, and old ideas made for an interesting media melange.
The face of journalism was changed forever as the media met high
tech with high tech, or "1-V-1" as the aviators like to say, and ad-
vanced into the desert brandishing their checkbooks. Money buys
high tech and the media used their money with an economy un-
matched by salary disputes. They purchased "fly-away" satellite
dishes, cellular telephones, laptop computers, and facsimile photo-
graphic units enabling them to shoot color images over interna-
tional satellite telephone lines in minutes.19
As the media flexed their newfound muscles, they introduced
truly live battlefield coverage of the Gulf War. Thereafter, not sur-
prisingly, live coverage of a rape trial in Florida 0 received higher
ratings than most miniseries, and 700 newsmen arrived in Indian-
apolis to cover the jury selection for Mike Tyson's rape trial.2 This
nation is suffering from "medius non-interruptus," and it is not
pleasant.
Neither advanced technology nor the new role of journalism,
historic as each might have been, can be considered a totally con-
structive societal force. On the one hand, an important aspect of
warfare, the moral responsibility for killing, has been placed in the
hands of computers.22 While on the other, the introduction of the
media onto the field of battle has created unique and impossible
situations for military commanders.
"' Id. at Dl. Luttwak "was trying to push a specific position, that the military should
rely on air power and not ground forces." Id.. Luttwak said, "As an advocate, you only make
forecasts when they are conclusive to your advocacy." Id. at D12.
19 See supra note 11.
20 See James Endrst, Was Smith Trial More Than Good TV?, HARTFORD COURANT,
Dec. 13, 1991, at D1. The entire William Kennedy Smith trial seemed like nothing more
than a TV mini-series with all the requisite elements: sex, violence, power, and ruined lives.
Id. Perhaps that explained the widespread public fascination with the trial. Id.
11 See James Grass, Jury Selection Begins in Tyson Rape Trial, GANNETT NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 27, 1992 (describing media rush to jury selection).
22 See William J. Broad, War in the Gulf: High Tech; War Hero Status Possible for
the Computer Chip, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1991, at AS (discussing use of computerized weap-
onry in Gulf War).
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For seven and a half months, world focus and opinion was cen-
tered daily on Saudi Arabia where every movement, utterance, and
issue was subjected to immediate and microscopic news media
analyses. Each picture, word, video and audio tape was scrupu-
lously studied and analyzed by every military and pseudo-military
expert in the world. The media had doctors, lawyers, diplomats,
military experts and even a few cooking critics analyzing every-
thing the military did or did not do.
While the weapons were designed for many battlefields, no one
could have written a meaner, nastier scenario than a war in the
middle of the Saudi desert in August, the hottest month of the
year. In August, camels bake, humans stay indoors in air condi-
tioned comfort, and even golfers play only in the early hours. But
during that period, the largest movement of troops and equipment
began as the Desert Shield forces moved into position to defend
Saudi Arabia and prepare for a possible thrust into Kuwait to re-
take the country.
During the military build-up from August to December, by my
own account more than 2,500 journalists and media technicians
registered with the U.S. military and Saudi Arabian officials,
matching the military build-up with their own incredible logistics.
But, there were never 2,500 at a single time. Most stayed for a
month or so and were then relieved. This placed a burden on the
military, since it had to re-orient the media replacements as to
what was going on. This became a never ending cycle.
In terms of total numbers of media personnel at one time, ap-
proximately 800 was the highest total.23 However, literally
thousands of additional journalists were clamoring to be allowed
into Saudi Arabia to, cover the build-up and imminent war. More
than 1,400 reporters, editors, producers, photographers, and tech-
nicians registered with the military in Saudi Arabia by February,
1991.
The initial coverage of Desert Shield was handled by the DoD
media pool, a contingent of seventeen journalists who pooled copy,
video, and still pictures to share with the world's media.24 While
"s Statement of Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 20, 1991) (on
file with author); see also Pete Williams, View From the Pentagon; Let's Face It, This Was
the Best War Coverage We've Ever Had, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1991, at D1 (listing number
of reporters at over 1,600 on the eve of the ground war).
", See Pete Schmeisser, Shooting Pool, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 1991, at 21. In
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this was satisfactory to some, it seems that the relentless pressures
of the media marketplace demanded that by-lined material be pro-
duced by every organization. The old adage, "it's no good if I
didn't do it," had full effect. Moreover, the financial capabilities of
the media allowed them to send anyone anywhere to acquire that
coverage. As a result, the local correspondents from San Jose, San
Antonio, Norfolk and Miami were right behind the network
anchors. The increasing influx of these news people in the weeks
that followed led to the establishment of the Joint Information
Bureau in Dhahran. 5
From the military's standpoint, it was clear that the media
were critical of our efforts.26 Media representatives have called
Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) "monitors" and "censors," and have
accused the military of controlling the newsy.2  Did we impede ac-
cess and censor the news media? Did we do our jobs? Did the
PAOs, journalists, and broadcasters understand their mission and
accomplish it? Did we help the media or hinder it? Are we guilty
of suppression and censorship, stupidity and short-sightedness?
response to the Gulf conflict, the Pentagon ordered six press officers to accompany a seven-
teen member press pool to Dhahran, thereby initiating media coverage in the Gulf. Id.; see
also War in the Gulf; Censors Screen Pooled Reports, N.Y. TIAEs, Feb. 11, 1991 at A12
(discussing how information obtained by pool reporters is reviewed by military censors
before distribution); Williams, supra note 23, at D4 (discussing development of the DoD
media pool to "ensure initial coverage of the U.S. buildup").
25 See Molly Moore & Howard Kurtz, Sweating Out the Gulf Story; In Saudi Arabia,
the Media Find Heat but Little Hot News, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1990, at B1 (describing
Joint Information Bureau as "makeshift public affairs shop in the back corner of a massive
hotel ballroom"); Schmeisser, supra note 24, at 21 (explaining how Assistant Secretary of
Defense, Pete Williams, set up Joint Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia).
26 See Thomas B. Rosenstiel, Gulf War No Model for Coverage, Media Tell Pentagon,
L.A. TIMES, July 1, 1991, at A4. Several of the nation's major news organizations sent a
report on the Gulf War to Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. Id. The report cited examples
of reporters being threatelied and arrested by American troops. Id. The report established
the media's preferred methods for press coverage of military operations. Id. But cf. James
DeParle, Keeping the News in Step: Are the Pentagon's Gulf War Rules Here to Stay?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1991, at A9 (noting public opinion polls showed majority of Americans
supported military over press).
27 See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson, Information: Media, Military in War Over Words;
War in the Middle East, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 1991, at 4. Only pool reporters had access
to American soldiers and pilots. Id. Further, such reporters had to be accompanied by mili-
tary escorts. Id. This was a war in which the military had the right to censor its product. Id.
However, there was no censorship of the Gulf Crisis. See generally Williams, supra note
23. To the contrary, the final decision to publish or broadcast was up to the journalists, not
the military. Id.
The rules for press coverage were solely intended to protect the U.S. troops, not to
sanitize military operations. Id.
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Did we recognize and assist the radio, TV, photographers, vide-
ographers and newspapers in acquiring their necessary by-lines?
Did we support the troops? Did they get enough information? Did
their families know and understand why they were in the desert?
There must be answers to these questions. Ask the public and
you will get one answer; ask the media and you will get another;
ask the military and yet another answer will be rolled out. As with
any controversy, it is a matter of perspective. From the military
side, it was dealing with the incredible number of news media that
ultimately covered the war. We could not believe how quickly they
could be assembled, outfitted, and dropped into our midst, with
orders to commit news every day. Consider the fact that every con-
tinent in the world had a news representative somewhere in Saudi
Arabia and few nations were not represented. There were enough
microwave dishes to pop popcorn in Cairo.
From the first seventeen members of the DoD national news
media pool we escorted into Saudi Arabia, the number quickly
grew to 350 in ten days, and to 900 by December. Despite con-
trolled entry, by January 15th, there were over 1,400 news media
and support personnel in Dhahran and Riyadh combined."' Had
there been an open door policy governing access to Saudi Arabia,
we estimate at least 10,000 news media would have been involved.
I believe that to be a reasonable estimate since during the 1984
Olympics in Los Angeles, for example, there were 9,400 sports jour-
nalists registered. This influx was unprecedented in Saudi Arabia
which had historically never issued more than twenty-two news
visas a year to allow journalists into the kingdom. Consequently,
there was no infrastructure or organization to support such
numbers.
Additionally, we saw enormous amounts of money spent by
news organizations to support their coverage. CNN spent $12 mil-
lion covering the build-up alone, and CNN, NBC, and CBS each
spent $1.5 million a week during hostilities.2 9 NBC-TV computed
the loss of advertising revenue and war coverage costs to be $37
28 See Peter Braestrup, Censored: Persian Gulf War Press Coverage Limited, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1991, at 16 (stating that there were over 500 journalists and TV techni-
cians in Riyadh and Dhahran); Statement by Pete Williams, supra note 23, at 7.
29 See, Ed Avis, Cash in the Sand, THE QUILL, Apr., 1991, at 18; Howard Kurtz, Gulf
Coverage Hits Media's Bottom Line; Salaries, Jobs Cut as Expenses Increase, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 1991, at A12 (summarizing estimated cost of war coverage by networks).
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million for the first month of hostilities.30 Print media, like the
Washington Post, paid $10,000 a week for each correspondent, not
including satellite charges.3 1 National Public Radio estimated its
cost at about $325,000 a month to cover the crisis. The Associated
Press, which added twenty-two correspondents to the forty-four al-
ready in the region at the start of the war, estimated its war cost to
be between $500,000 and $600,000 a month.2
This well-armed media force created a multitude of issues,
some legitimate and some illegitimate. The initial coverage cen-
tered on the introduction of men and equipment to Saudi Arabia.3
Next, focus shifted to the "how do they cope" phase: how do the
women cope in a man's world, how do the weapon's cope, can they
withstand the heat and sand?34 Thereafter, the news coverage
targeted the real issues: could we really drink eight gallons of water
a day,3 5 where would we get it, 36 and, obviously, where did we put
it? The media then tackled food,37 MRE's, medical facilities, 38
mail,39 ships,40 weapons,41 light weight uniforms versus heavier
uniforms,42 gas masks,43 and protective clothing.44
11 Avis, supra note 29, at 18.
31 Id.
32 Id.
" See, e.g., Juan Walte, "Desert War:" What it Takes; Air Battle Only Way to Win,
Experts Say, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1990, at 1 (reporting on troops and equipment arriving in
Gulf).
" See, e.g., Susan Page, Steps Toward War, NEWSDAY, Nov. 24, 1990, at 3 (Nassau ed.)
(unique issues of desert warfare such as effect on sand).
32 See, e.g., James LeMoyne, Confrontation in the Gulf, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 29, 1990, at
5 (staying cool in desert and need for water).
" See, e.g., Roger Simon, The Contract with Uncle Sam has an Asterisk, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1990, at E12 (getting bottled water to troops); David Wilson, A Thirst for War,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1990, at 19 (Gatorade donated to troops).
17 See, e.g., Robert Costello, Stalemate is Path to Victory; Persian Gulf: Wars are Won
Without A Shot Being Fired, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1990, at B7 (describing U.S. supply of
food to troops); Page, supra note 34, at 3 (reviewing unique effects of desert warfare on food
delivery).
38 See, e.g., Tamara Jones, U.S. Hospitals in Europe Not Ready for War, L.A. TiMES,
Dec. 31, 1990, at Al (noting hospitals ill-equipped in case war breaks out).
1 See, e.g., Walte, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing mail delivery to troops).
40 See, e.g., id. (discussing troops and ships).
" See, e.g., Costello, supra note 37, at B7 (describing how military put in place enough
weapons in short time).
42 See, e.g., Walte, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing special uniforms utilized by the
British).
43 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 36, at E12 (indicating profits made by manufacturers of
gas masks).
4 See Patrick Sloyan, Chilling 'Worst Case' in Gulf; Biological and Nuclear Attacks
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We went through the hysteria of whether women can serve
alongside men, whether they can work in Arabia and whether they
will be up to the tasks?45 Not surprisingly, the answers were all an
emphatic "yes."
There was a glut of stories on how we treated the Saudis, how
they treated us, how Saudis treated our women,46 and how the
women treated the Saudis. There was also coverage of how we
treated each other, how the Saudis treated Saudis who dealt with
us, how the Saudis were treating the media, how the treatment of
Saudis was being treated in the media,47 and, finally, the media
covered how the media were treating each other in Saudi Arabia.
We went through stories on whether this was an offensive or
defensive operation and whether we had the men and equipment
to perform either task efficiently.4 s We had to describe how we en-
sured that no camels were killed in gunfire exercises, 49 and what we
would do if they were injured.
We took the media up in planes, 50 out on ships,51 and into the
desert at least a thousand times with the tanks,52 HUMMV's,
Bradley fighting vehicles, and the grunts. The media were also
taken on amphibious exercises, live gunfire exercises, night vision
Seen, NEWSDAY, Nov. 8, 1990, at 7 (reviewing preparation for biological warfare and types of
protection).
"I See Nancy Benac, Debate Persists over Women's Place in a War Zone, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1990, at A8 (America realizing women may die); Deanna Hodgin, Sight of Female
Troops Stirs Macho Zeal Among Iraqis, WASH. TIMs, Dec. 21, 1990, at A7 (noting that
Iraqi troops fight harder to avoid humiliation of losing to women).
" See, e.g., Lance Morrow, A Long Hallucination of War, TIME, Dec. 10, 1990, at 40
(discussing statements by National Organization for Women); Christopher Walker, King
Fahd is Nudged into Cautious Steps Towards Democracy, TIME, Nov. 8, 1990, at 1.
See generally Don Kowet, Are the Media Inventing a New Anti-War Movement?,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1990, at El (discussing whether media added to war by representing
obscure groups); Moore & Kurtz, supra note 25, at B1 (noting effect of heat on reporters
covering the story and their equipment); What Other Newspapers are Saying, Cm. TwB.,
May 18, 1991, at C19 (reporting on what other news organizations were reporting).
48 See generally Amy Wallace, Gulf Crisis Spurs Crisis of Morals, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1990, at B1 (analyzing whether conscientious objector status related to offensive type opera-
tion); David Firestone, U.S. Churches Saying No to Gulf War, NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1990, at 4
(reviewing moral urgency of whether Gulf War was necessary to avoid deaths).
" See, e.g., James LeMoyne, Confrontation in the Gulf. War May be at Hand, but
Bedouins Find Their Desert Peaceful, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1990, at 5 (describing how
military performed operations around camels).
50 See DeParle, supra note 26, at A9 (describing press view of battle via military
aircraft).
" See, e.g., Susan Sachs, Aircraft Carrier's Complex Ballet, NEWSDAY, Dec. 30, 1990, at
13 (reporting from aircraft carrier).
2 See, e.g., LeMoyne, supra note 49, at 5 (story written while with tanks in desert).
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goggle exercises, and aerial refueling operations.5 3 And yet the me-
dia proclaimed that they did not have the access they needed to
tell the story. 4
Of paramount importance to the military, however, was the
preservation of the security and integrity of the operation so as not
to endanger U.S. or coalition military personnel. The needs of the
military and the coalition governments had to be balanced with
the public's right to know. This was done by security review of
news stories and pictures, both still and electronic.5 5 It is to the
credit of the escort officers that very few violations occurred with
little impediment to reporting.56
Contrary to reports, the majority of the journalists were re-
sponsible, patriotic men and women who were concerned with the
safety of the troops. The accidental release of information which
occurred from time to time, I believe, was inadvertent in nature
and reflected the immediacy of the event, or in some cases, the
ignorance of the reporter concerning military operations. 7
We saw first-hand the incredible pressures that the competi-
tive news marketplace puts on news teams, producers, directors,
and editors." However, no one in the military or the public had
recognized the pedestal on which some of the media had put them-
" See generally David Evans, As Desert Deployment Grows, U.S. Military Keeps Me-
dia at Arm's Length, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 1990, at C1 (describing attempt to cover war with
military); James LeMoyne, supra note 49, Sept. 29, 1990, at 5 (reporting on location with
troops).
"' See DeParle, supra note 50, at Al (reviewing media access during the war); H.D.S.
Greenway, Press vs. Military: It's Time to Strike a Balance, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1991, at
11 (panel discussing media access during the hostilities); David Broder, Some Groundless
Gripes over Ground Rules, CH. TRI., Mar. 21, 1991, at C27 (personal account of exclusion
due to press restrictions).
5 See DeParle, supra, note 26, at A9 (how reporters were treated during the Gulf War
by military); John LaForge, Censorship Made Its Mark in Brutal Legacy of Gulf War, STAR
TRIB., Jan. 19, 1992, at 27A (reporting on censorship during Gulf War); Molly Moore, Press
Finding Open Doors at "Desert Shield", WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1990, at A18 (access to
military operations by the media).
11 See Greenway, supra note 54, at 11 (noting assignment of press pools to escort of-
ficers); Tom Wicker, 'Marketing' the War, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1991, at A23 (reviewing how
military escort officers used).
11 See, e.g., Greenway, supra note 54, at 11 (describing incident of inadvertent release
of information).
Il See Sharon Waxman, Across Europe, Turned On by CNN, Apr. 16, 1991, WASH.
POST, at B2 (reviewing TV's scramble for ideas during coverage); see also Brian Donlon,
Anchors' Gulf Plans on Hold, USA TODAY, Aug. 8, 1990 (discussing news anchor's attempt
to get story).
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selves in the pursuit of news and information."9 Apparently, the
media did not understand the public backlash created when some
of them, certainly not all of them, declared themselves non-partici-
pants and above the bounds of citizenship and country. You can-
not declare yourself Switzerland unless you make watches and
yodel!
We did not believe that some of the media still carried bag-
gage from Vietnam. Unfortunately, many carried a paranoid suspi-
cion of military leadership, 0 skepticism about weapons, mistrust of
the administration,6 1 and a total lack of knowledge about the new
all-volunteer military 2 along with their Vietnam views.
We worried that a similar set of Vietnam baggage might be
carried by our senior enlisted and officer corps. But we thought
that we had done an adequate training job with our senior leaders
to create an atmosphere of media awareness, an understanding of
the role of the news media in our society and why we must work
with them. This was the situation in many cases, but while many
leaders reflected this media consciousness, 63 others went into com-
plete comas and refused to awaken. 4
We knew that it would take a unique organization and media
battle plan to allow reporters to cover the war while ensuring oper-
ational security, tactical surprise, and the safety of American lives.
As a result, the Joint Information Bureau was created as an
honest effort to support combat correspondence pools. 5 The pools
were supposed to provide the most equitable means of allowing
" See, e.g., Charles Freund, The War on Your Mind, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1991, at C3
(reviewing effect on viewers of Peter Arnett's reports from behind enemy lines); Terry Pris-
tin, News Correspondents Claim Media Bought Military Spin on Gulf War, L.A. Timrs,
Apr. 6, 1991, at B6 (noting how much of press covered war with military cooperation).
"0 See Marcus Raskin, A Permanent War Mentality, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1991, at
A23 (discussing public perception that U.S. was unwilling and unable to use military force
since Vietnam); see also Pristin, supra note 59, at B6 (discussing manipulation of media by
military).
" See George Wilson, Dealing with Saddam in the Shadow of Vietnam, WASH. POST,
Dec. 2, 1990, at C1 (comparing President Bush to President Johnson during Vietnam).
02 See Raskin, supra note 60, at A23 (noting public unawareness of covert wars fought
by U.S.).
63 See James LeMoyne, Troops In Gulf Talk of War, And of Vietnam and Respect,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at 1 (reporting that troops were well aware of duty to inform
media despite vague notions of why they were in Gulf).
6 See DeParle, supra note 26, at A9 (discussing failure of certain military officers to
speak to media).
66 See Wicker, supra note 56, at A23 (discussing weakness of combat correspondence
pools).
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coverage by the largest group of media, but they did not work that
way. Perhaps more than anything else, the pools were considered
the most onerous form of control by the reporters. They totally
misunderstood the concept.
The military tried to explain that this would be a 40 mile per
hour war. American units would move quickly and to cover them,
you had to be a part of that unit. If the reporters would not work
with the military, they would have to contend with a unique and
unprecedented warfare situation. Consider this: The desert was
faceless and trackless, with no signposts, no landmarks, no means
of identifying areas or locales. There were no permanent encamp-
ments near the front which reporters could join. There would be
flexible, fluid battle lines so that no one would know for sure where
the front was located. The weapons used on both sides were
designed to defeat armor, and no one outside armored vehicles was
likely to survive. There were no trees, rocks, buildings or walls to
stand behind. Finally, because most of the battles would be fought
at night using our decidedly superior night-fighting capabilities,'
anyone venturing out at night would be a target, for the good and
the bad guys.
In the end, an average of 165 reporters and support personnel
were put into U.S. units in fourteen pools and allowed to cover the
war. 6 By comparison, of the 461 reporters with the Eisenhower
HQ in England, only twenty-seven eventually went with U.S.
Forces on D-Day. By the media's own estimates, there were never
more than seventy-five reporters out "in the bush" under fire at
any one time in Vietnam.
The American public saw three briefings a day from compe-
tent, battle-trained, knowledgeable senior officers. And, I might
add, the reporters in Riyadh got two additional, off-the-record
briefings each day.6 7
In the final analysis, the media did cover the war, and the
American public got an honest, accurate, and free-flowing assess-
ment of their men and women in combat. And they got it in the
most expeditious manner.
What lessons did we learn? Clearly, the news media are here
to stay. They are one of the most important parts of our free soci-
ety. The news media are the chroniclers of history. Their images,
11 See Pristin, supra note 59, at B6.
7 See DeParle, supra note 26, at A9.
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words, and analyses will be used as part of the mosaic of history.
Thus, the military must figure out how to accommodate and work
with the media to assist them in getting and using wisely that in-
formation. Conversely, while the fourth estate may provide one of
the checks and balances for a democracy, during wartime they too
require checks and balances. That, partly, is the military's role. We
have to help them, educate them, answer their questions, but
maintain and protect the integrity of an ongoing operation. We
must all understand that in our global information village, the en-
emy will have as much access to the news stories as do our families
at home. Nevertheless, keeping Americans alive is the military's
responsibility, a role they will not delegate nor jeopardize.
Finally, we learned that any dealings between the military and
the media will be, by benefit of each of their unique responsibili-
ties to our free society, confrontational. This is acceptable. Con-
frontation, friction, and honest, objective professional disagree-
ment keep both sides fresh and alert and are implicit in a
democratic society.
Working in such a fish bowl as the military does, is the price
paid to live in a democracy. Investigative journalists are the legacy
paid for years of stone-walling, obfuscation, and disregard for pub-
lic property by some members of government, in and out of the
service. Nonetheless, military personnel have adapted and re-
sponded to the rigors of responding to the media for a number of
reasons.6 8 First, and most obvious, because it is federal law. Sec-
ond, because many of us understand that we are only the stewards
of the public, using materials and equipment on loan to us from
the public. Finally, because, in the final analysis, the media really
are the watchdogs of democracy. They have ferreted out mistakes,
uncovered malfeasance and generally kept the nation-and its mil-
itary-on their toes.
8 See Pristin, supra note 59, at B6.
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